Threat model

Bellows aims to be operator-blind: the person who runs one learns nothing worth taking from it. This page says what each party can see and do in a sealed deployment (Run your own), what the design assumes, and where it is weak. It follows the wording rule in DESIGN.md: "the operator cannot read" is said only of the words and of money and state; who is asking is "hidden from the operator when you use a relay or Tor".

Parts of this depend on sealed hardware and on Tinfoil's platform behaving as documented. Release 0.1.2 runs sealed on Tinfoil Containers at the reference instance, and not every one of those parts has been checked there; Run your own lists the ones that have not.

Three things to hide, three mechanisms

WhatHidden from the operator by
The words: requests and answersBellows runs in a confidential VM. Clients check a hardware attestation of the build, then encrypt to a key that exists only inside it (Oblivious HTTP, Oblivious HTTP)
Money and state: balances, the wallet seed, supplier keys, the admin tokenThe database is on an encrypted volume, and the keys are released by a keyserver only to an approved build, after it proves what it is
Who is asking: address and timingA relay run by someone else, or Tor. The relay sees an address and no content; Bellows sees content and no address

What each party can see

PartySeesDoes not see
ClientIts own requests, answers and balanceOther clients
Operator (runs the deployment and the keyserver)Aggregates from the admin API (revenue, totals owed, counts, supplier costs, health), the instance's logs, which hold no client data (Privacy), traffic volume and timing at the host. Without a relay or Tor, client network addressesThe words, per-customer balances, the wallet seed, supplier keys. The operator cannot read these: they exist in plaintext only inside the sealed machine. Client addresses are hidden from the operator when clients use a relay or Tor
Relay operatorThe client's network address, timing and the size of encrypted messagesThe words, which are encrypted to Bellows' attested key
Hosting platform (Tinfoil)What the operator's host sees: timing, volume, addresses without a relay, encrypted disk blocks and which blocks are read and writtenThe words and the state, provided the hardware and the attested runtime hold. Secrets come from the operator's keyserver, not from Tinfoil's secret store
Hardware vendor (AMD or Intel)Nothing by default
AI supplierThe prompts and answers of plaintext models, with Bellows as the caller. For private models, nothing: the body is encrypted end to end to the model's own enclave and Bellows passes it through unread (Privacy)Who the client is
MintThe gateway's eCash operations, and the client's own when the client deals with the mintWhich client a gateway operation is for
Nostr relaysPublished operator announcements, and the discovery queries Bellows makes for mint reviewsClients
Network observerEncrypted traffic between the parties aboveThe words

What the operator can do

The operator approves releases

The operator runs the keyserver and writes its policy. An operator who approves a malicious build of their own in that policy can make it receive the volume key and the wallet secret, and so read the state. Clients detect such a build: it is not in the public builds.json, so they refuse to send it anything. The state already on the volume is exposed all the same. This is the known weak point of version 1. A later version moves approval to a key the day-to-day operator does not hold.

Rollback

The encrypted volume detects a changed block but not an old one. Whoever controls the disk can put back an earlier copy of the volume, and the enclave does not notice. A rolled-back ledger can owe customers what they have already spent, or forget payments. Version 1 documents this and does not solve it.

Access patterns

The disk encryption hides contents, not which blocks are read and written, or when. A privileged observer of the host can learn something about activity from that.

What the design assumes

What the deploy kit enforces

pnpm deploy:check refuses a config that would break one of these assumptions from the inside: a second container with attestation access (it could attest a statement with its own key), a second container with secrets or with access to Bellows' volume (the tor sidecar has open egress), a container without a read-only root file system, admin access to the enclave, open ports, secrets in the measured file or in Tinfoil's secret store, a database off the encrypted volume, a volume without a keyserver-released key, unmeasured settings, or open egress for Bellows. See Run your own.

What it does not cover

This page is docs/THREAT-MODEL.md in the repository.