Privacy

What the gateway can see depends on the tier and on whether the client encrypts.

Never stored or logged, any tier

Streams are read in memory as they pass, to count tokens when the supplier does not report usage. Only counters are kept.

Per tier

Standard (for example Token Factory)Enclave, plaintextEnclave, encrypted (EHBP)
X-Forge-Privacy headerstandardenclave-plaintextenclave-encrypted
Gateway sees prompt and replyYes, in memory while relayingYes, in memory while relayingNo: bodies are HPKE ciphertext end to end
Supplier sees prompt and replyYesOnly inside an attested enclaveOnly inside an attested enclave
Gateway seesModel, sizes, usage, timingSameModel name, body size, max output tokens, frame count, timing, usage numbers reported by Tinfoil
How usage is measuredUpstream usageUpstream usageX-Tinfoil-Usage-Metrics response header (non-streaming) or HTTP trailer (streaming); else flat schedule

Payment links: with a balance key, every request on that key is linkable to the others. A P2PK lock key is a stable identifier: reusing one key links the payouts locked to it, at the gateway and at the mint, which sees the key in the locked proofs when they are redeemed. Use a fresh key per payout (cashu.me warns when a key was used before) if that matters. With NUT-24, requests are not linked by the gateway, but the mint knows its own swaps. Bellows reads no client address, but the host it runs on, its network and anything in front of it, such as a reverse proxy, still see client addresses. Client addresses are hidden from the operator when you use an Oblivious HTTP relay run by someone else, or Tor (Oblivious HTTP). A VPN moves the address to the VPN provider.

The operator API and CLI show totals and counts only: no listing of balances, fundings or requests. Once a balance has been funded it is no longer linked to the invite that opened it.

Funding

Encrypted pass-through (Tinfoil EHBP)

Tinfoil's Encrypted HTTP Body Protocol encrypts request and response bodies with HPKE to a key held inside an attested enclave, and leaves headers readable. Bellows follows Tinfoil's proxy guide (docs.tinfoil.sh/guides/proxy-server):

Verified so far: the e2e suite runs these flows against a fake enclave (header and trailer usage, untouched bytes, allowlist). Before this engine was extracted from the Forge AI app, a browser client using Tinfoil's tinfoil SDK (1.4.0) verified the live Tinfoil attestation and sent an EHBP request through this encrypted path. A full round trip against a real Tinfoil enclave needs a TINFOIL_API_KEY and has not been run.

Client apps

Bellows serves no web page. A client app (a chat app, an agent, a script) runs on the user's device and talks to the API. What it stores, and what it sends, is up to that app.

File attachments are the client's job too. An app reads a file on the device and sends its text inside the message, for example as a <file name="report.pdf" pages="12">...</file> block. To Bellows that is message content like any other: relayed in memory (or, encrypted, never readable), never logged or stored. test/e2e/files-privacy.e2e.test.ts checks the logs and the database for file text on both the plaintext and the encrypted path.

This page is docs/PRIVACY.md in the repository.